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ABSTRACT 
There is an influential, neo-liberal proposition in the scholarly literature on China’s economic 
transformation since the late 1970s. It states that China’s reformed economic institutions are a 
mix of market-conforming and market-supplanting elements, that its developmental 
achievements so far have been ascribable to the conforming elements whereas the 
accumulated problems being ascribable to the supplanting elements, and that the problems 
have tended to outweigh the achievements as the country’s economic transition progresses 
from the allegedly easy phase to the difficult phase. This paper offers an alternative 
interpretation of the Chinese experience. The central proposition is that China’s economic 
institutions could be seen in favourable light both theoretically and with reference to the East 
Asian development experience. Specifically, the developmental implications of the market-
conforming and market-supplanting elements should not be understood in any absolute sense, 
but rather depend on the appropriate match or otherwise between the institutions and the 
external environment. The developmental achievements to date indicate that China’s 
economic reform has managed to achieve a basically appropriate match between the two 
aspects, although enormous uncertainties still cloud over the future prospects owing to 
changes both in the external environment and the reform strategies of the state leadership. 
 
Keywords: China, East Asia, late development. 
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1. Introduction 
 
China is unique in having survived well the three waves of economic catastrophes that beset 
the non-Western world over the past quarter-century, commonly known as the era of 
globalisation. These catastrophes, namely, are: first, the ‘lost decades of development’ in 
most parts of the Third World since the early 1980s, second, the total crisis in countries of the 
former Soviet bloc since the mid-1980s, and, third, the financial and economic crisis that 
engulfed most parts of East Asia in the closing years of the century. This uniqueness is all the 
more surprising, given China’s economic institutions and development policies that have long 
been considered by the world orthodox establishment as by nature seriously deviating from 
the free market economy and hence being akin to the crisis-causing factors of the three 
entities indicated above. How, then, has this ‘China paradox’ come about? 
 There is of course no shortage of denial from the orthodox establishment in the world 
political economy that the Chinese experience is anything a paradox. A recurring popular 
claim has it that, given a long enough time span, an economic collapse of comparable scale is 
bound to beset the country, as a punishment for its deviation from the established world 
standards. At a more scholarly level, there has long been a proposition stating that China’s 
reformed economic institutions are a mix of market-conforming and market-supplanting 
elements, that its developmental achievements so far have been ascribable to the conforming 
elements whereas the accumulated problems being ascribable to the supplanting elements, 
and that the problems have tended to outweigh the achievements as the country’s economic 
transition progresses from the allegedly easy phase to the difficult phase. Hence, the future 
prospects for the Chinese economy is at best uncertain and more likely crisis-prone (writings 
in this tradition include Cao et al. [1997], Fan and Woo [1996], and Lardy [1998]; see also 
IMF [2000] and World Bank [2002]). 
 This paper offers an alternative interpretation of the Chinese experience. The central 
proposition is that China’s reformed economic institutions could be seen in favourable light 
both theoretically and with reference to the East Asian development experience. Specifically, 
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the developmental implications of the market-conforming and market-supplanting elements 
should not be understood in any absolute sense – as believers of the free market model would 
have it – but rather depend on the appropriate match or otherwise between the institutions and 
the external environment. The developmental achievements over the past two decades 
indicate that China’s economic reform has managed to achieve a basically appropriate match 
between the two aspects, although enormous uncertainties still cloud over the future prospects 
owing to changes both in the external environment and the reform strategies of the state 
leadership. The interpretation thus gives rise to policy implications that are very different 
from the orthodox prescription. 
 This paper is organized in five sections. Section two reviews the scholarly literature 
on East Asia’s financial and economic crisis as well as its previous developmental 
achievements known as the ‘East Asian miracle’. This leads to a number of observations that 
are, in turn, used as references for assessing China’s economic reform and development in 
section three. From this perspective, the section identifies the main constraints faced by the 
Chinese state leadership and the main options opened to it in future economic reform. Section 
four turns to the more specific aspect of China’s enterprise-level reform, which has been at 
the heart of the overall economic transformation. On the basis of empirical evidence, the 
section raises four main propositions which constitute an interpretation of Chinese reform 
experience that is in sharp contrast to the orthodox, market-centred visions. Section five 
draws some policy and analytical conclusions. 
 
2. The ‘East Asian Model’, the Crisis and the Miracle 
 
The financial and economic crisis that engulfed East Asia in the late 1990s gives rise to three 
analytical questions that require adequate answers (Lo [1999a] gives a synthesizing account 
of the main issues reviewed in this section). First, to the extent that the crisis was indeed 
related to the domestic political-economic institutions of the affected countries, why, then, 
were the basically same institutions capable of contributing to the previous, decades-long 
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rapid and sustained economic growth known as ‘the East Asian miracle’? Second, given that 
there were in fact diverse institutions in the different countries affected at the time the crisis 
erupted, why did the crisis sweep to the region as a whole? Third, in view of the basically 
healthy macroeconomic conditions of the countries before the crisis, why did the crisis reach 
such a disproportionate scale? 
 As recounted by Wade (1998), interpretations of the East Asian crisis have coalesced 
around two rival stories – namely, the ‘death throes of Asian state capitalism’ story about 
internal, real economy causes; and the ‘panic triggering debt deflation in a basically sound but 
under-regulated system’ story that gives more role to external and financial system causes. 
The former story considers East Asia’s economic institutions as intrinsically inefficient, 
particularly because of the powerful influence of the state over the economy. The ‘panic’ 
story, in contrast, attributes the crisis mainly to the inadequate regulation of East Asian states 
over short-term international capital flows. It considers these capital flows as largely 
speculative and are prone to cause excessive volatility in the currency and financial markets. 
The spread of the crisis to the region as a whole and beyond in the form of contagion, in this 
view, confirms that financial panic itself is the main cause of the crisis. Furthermore, the 
nature of financial panic is such that it could combine with the contraction of demand to form 
a vicious circle of bankruptcy, financial market collapse, and more falling demand, thus 
pushing a weak economy into deep recession. 
 Wade’s taxonomy is useful for characterizing the existing interpretations of the East 
Asian crisis. However, by coupling the emphasis on internal causes with that on the real 
economy, and the emphasis on external causes with that on the financial market, this 
taxonomy appears to be too rigid. It precludes the analysis of the crisis in terms of a different 
way of combining the four aspects, particularly in terms of unravelling the relationship 
between the real-economic problems and the financial panic. Yet, it is clear that, whilst the 
‘death throes’ story has difficulty in explaining the contagion, the ‘panic’ story does not really 
answer the third question indicated above: that is, why did the crisis in East Asia reach such 
an exceptionally large scale? 
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 To answer this last question, it is necessary to examine the nature of East Asia’s 
economic institutions in relation to the unfolding of the crisis. In a separate paper, Wade and 
Veneroso (1998) in fact explicitly take up this task. There, the essential message is that East 
Asia’s ‘high household saving, high corporate debt’ economy is vulnerable to systemic 
shocks, especially if the shocks take the form of high interest rates, currency devaluation, or 
demand contraction. This is because high interest rates or currency devaluation would 
increase the cost of servicing debts, while demand contraction would reduce corporate profits. 
When interest payment is in excess of profits, firms would have no other option but to 
increase total debts. Yet, coping with the shocks this way is not usually possible in the context 
of East Asia where firms are already heavily in-debted. Moreover, because, unlike equity 
which requires a share of profits, debt requires a fixed level of repayment, firms would 
normally be alone in bearing the brunt of the systemic shocks. This makes their vulnerability 
to systemic shocks even more pronounced – hence the disproportional scale of the financial 
and economic crisis. 
 But, it is necessary to further clarify the developmental implications of East Asia’s 
peculiar economic institutions, which mediate the ‘high household saving, high corporate 
debt’ model. The observation is not much in dispute: that the institutions deviate seriously 
from the canonical free market economy. The essential characteristic of the institutions – in 
the form of renowned arrangements such as the Japanese main-bank system, subcontracting, 
enterprise grouping, the practice of life-time employment, etc. – is to emphasize long-term 
relationships and the accountability of firms to all stake-holders (as opposed to share-holders 
alone). In other words, the institutions are infused with rigidities, implying a suppression of 
market regulation in the ‘factor’ markets. Is this characteristic a weakness or a strength? For, 
whereas orthodox economists simply use the term ‘inefficiency’ to characterize the nature of 
the institutions, dissident writers like Wade consider the vulnerability of the institutions as a 
necessary trade-off with the benefits of promoting the region’s ‘high-intensity investment, 
export-oriented’ development path. 
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 The significance of the ‘high-intensity investment, export-oriented’ development path 
is such that it bases the East Asian miracle on productivity growth, rather than on the 
notorious notion of cheap labour. A well-developed and influential body of studies have 
indicated that the productivity growth comes from two main sources: continuous innovation 
and industrial upgrading (Amsden [1989] and Wade [1990] are representative works in this 
tradition). For the former, an important form is collective learning effects. With the enterprise 
system being characterized by an emphasis on long-term relationships and accountability to 
all stake-holders, major agents in the system tend to have good incentives for developing 
work skills and improving production techniques, and these have been in turn translated into 
productivity growth via horizontal co-ordination mechanisms such as quality circles and just-
in-time practices (Aoki [1990] gives a good exposition on this). 
 Turning to the matter of industrial upgrading, the debate in the literature has focused 
on the efficacy or otherwise of state intervention, particularly state industrial policy. What 
seems to be more crucial, however, is the precondition upon which industrial policy could be 
implemented – that is, high-intensity investment. For, such investment not only deviates from 
the ‘given’ international comparative advantage, but it also is of massive amounts and with 
slow returns in nature. It is unlikely to materialize purely under the regulation of the market, 
and, at the aggregate level, there is also a serious problem concerning the sources of funds. It 
is precisely at this point that the ‘high household saving, high corporate debt’ economy comes 
to play. Its concrete manifestation in East Asia is the bank-based (rather than market-based) 
financial system on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the state’s restrictions on financial 
market liberalization and its frequent intervention in the sector. All these combine to give rise 
to a development-oriented, reciprocity relationship, where firms exchange good performance 
for policy favours from the state authorities. 
 This said, however, writers in this tradition typically do not consider the advantages 
exhibited in East Asia’s economic institutions as in any sense absolute. Unlike orthodox 
economists who often compare the reality with the notional model of the free market 
economy (and hence the notion of the natural path of development) and characterize any 
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deviation thereof as inefficiency, the writers have made it clear that the developmental 
implications of the institutions depend on their appropriate match or otherwise with the 
external, particularly demand-side environment. As Aoki (1990) puts it, in order that the 
institutions could promote collective learning and therefore productivity growth, the market 
demand environment must be continuously changing but in a steady fashion. A stable market 
environment tends to favour the (stylized) American-type big business which is infused with 
especially serious rigidities, whereas a rapidly changing environment tends to favour the 
atomistic firm of the arm’s-length market relationship, which is highly flexible. It is in-
between the two extreme conditions that East Asian institutions have their competitive 
advantage. The emphasis on the appropriate match or otherwise between institutions and the 
external environment thus provides an convincing answer to the first question indicated 
above: that is, why did the basically same institutions contribute to both the previous 
economic miracle and the later crisis? It also offers an insightful perspective for examining 
China’s experience of economic transformation. 
 
3. China’s Economic Transformation: Contradictions and Options 
 
Turning to the case of China, an immediate point to note concerns whether an East Asian-type 
financial crisis is likely to occur in the country. From the perspective of the financial panic 
story, that appears to be unlikely. After all, China has accumulated a huge amount of foreign 
exchange reserve, its foreign debts are well within a manageable limit, and the dependence of 
its economy on exports (either as a source of macroeconomic demand, or as a means to pay 
for needed imports) is of a low degree. All these, together with state controls over the capital 
account, leave very limited scope for the run on its currency and financial assets by 
international speculative capital. More fundamentally, and in the domestic front, it is well 
known that China’s corporate debts are mainly domestic debts, that Chinese banks are state-
owned, that the indebtedness of the state is within a manageable limit, and that there exists a 
huge amount of saving in the domestic economy – all these combine to imply that any 
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problem of insolvency or illiquidity of economy-wide scale, if it does exist, could be resolved 
with no insurmountable difficulties. 
 This said, however, it is also well known that the Chinese economy does have its 
own, serious problems. The foremost one concerns its financial sector, or more precisely the 
problem of non-performing loans which has put the state banks at risk. Estimates of the scale 
of the problem vary widely, from an officially announced ratio of around 25% of non-
performing loans to total bank lending to that of up to 50% according to foreign observers. A 
main reason that gives rise to the large gap among the different estimates is that the quality of 
a substantial proportion of total bank lending is contingent on the general condition of the 
economy. That, in part, explains the imperative for maintaining a substantial rate of economic 
growth in China. Whatever the actual scale of the problem, it is sufficiently serious to have 
prompted the state leadership to adopt a range of policies since late 1997 for restructuring and 
strengthening the banking sector. After all, from the perspective of the ‘death throes’ theory 
of the East Asian financial crisis, excessive lending by the banking sector was at the heart of 
the crisis. Though somewhat discredited for being a partial view, the ‘death throes’ theory 
does contain elements of truth and has been taken by the Chinese leadership seriously. 
 The problem of China’s banking sector needs to be put in perspective. Succinctly, it 
reflects a much more fundamental contradiction in the country, after two decades of market 
reform. This, namely, is the weak financial position of the state itself – a contradiction arising 
from the state’s obligation to maintain a sizeable state-owned economic sector on the one 
hand, and its shrinking share in national saving on the other hand. Figure 1 illustrates the first 
half of the contradiction. It is noted that the output, employment and capital shares of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) in Chinese industry, albeit having decreased massively, are still at 
substantial levels today. On the eve of the East Asian crisis, in 1997, SOEs accounted for 34% 
of value-added, 40% of labour employment and 42% of fixed assets of Chinese industry as a 
whole. Subsequent years till 2002 witnessed a massive shrinkage in the employment share to 
26%, and a substantial increase in the capital share to 47%, while the output share remained at 
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the same level of 34%. Outside industry, SOEs’ output and capital shares in services sectors 
such as commerce, transportation and communication are higher than these levels. 
[Figure 1] 
 Meanwhile, Figure 2 clearly illustrates the other half of the indicated contradiction: 
the shrinking share of the state in national saving. In terms of the deposits with financial 
institutions, the share of the state decreased from 32% in 1983 to 12% in 2002, whilst that of 
enterprises increased from 33% to 35% and that of households increased from 35% to 53%. 
And there was also a massive decrease in the GDP share of state revenue, from 26% in 1980 
to around 11% in most years of the 1990s, before rebounding to 18% in 2002. All these have 
seriously constrained the capability of the state in investing in SOEs. 
[Figure 2] 
 The main way through which the indicated contradiction has been resolved is 
precisely the mediation of state banks. As can be seen from Table 1, despite all the reforms in 
financial liberalization, state banks have continued to control a vast-majority share of total 
loanable funds in the economy. In 2001, they accounted for 81% of the total of credit funds 
used, and 77% of loans, of all financial institutions in China. Put another way, the state has 
been in a position of virtually monopolizing the allocation of financial resources in the 
economy. As a result, and in conjunction with the state policy of under-capitalization since 
the lending-for-appropriation (bogaidai) reform in 1983, where bank lending replaced state 
budgetary allocation as the main source of external financing for industrial firms, China’s 
industrial SOEs (as well as SOEs in other sectors) have become seriously indebted. Their 
average debt-to-asset ratio increased from 19% in 1980 to the peak of 79% in 1994, before 
gradually decreasing to 59% in 2002 (see Chan [1998] for an analysis of this development, 
and data from various issues of China Statistical Yearbook). The other side of the coin is thus 
heavy burdens on state banks in the form of expanding non-performing loans, amid the 
secular decline in industrial profitability particularly because of the slowdown of economic 
growth in the second half of the 1990s. 
[Table 1] 
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 From the description above, it is clear that, after two decades of reform, China has 
become similar to the typical East Asian economies in having a ‘high household saving, high 
corporate debt’ economic pattern with the state playing a central role in mediation. If the 
discussion in the previous section regarding the developmental implications of such a pattern 
contains elements of truth, it is logical to consider the extent to which China would be able to 
re-play the acclaimed East Asian miracle, on top of its own miracle of the past two decades. 
For, the economic pattern provides grounds for establishing a reciprocity relationship 
whereby enterprises use good performance to exchange for state favour in capital allocation – 
a relationship that has been regarded by many economists as essential to successful late 
development. The fact that China’s non-SOEs also have a comparable level of indebtedness 
reinforces the leverage of the state in promoting economic development along this line. The 
crucial question here, however, is: what kind of enterprise performance? 
 At one level, there are issues related to the demand side. It is clear that China has 
been capable of achieving the first half-part of the East Asian model of development: that is, 
high-intensity investment for the development of dynamic industries. But, it is far less certain 
with regard to the second half-part, namely, the degree of export-orientation that is sufficient 
for realizing the increasing returns and/or technological externalities of the established 
industries. In the context of the prevailing world political-economic conditions, Chinese 
industry is bound to face intensifying trade restrictions in foreign markets and competitive 
pressure from foreign firms in the home market. Thus, ultimately, it has to fall back on the 
support of domestic demand. This point will be picked up again and looked at in more details 
in the next section. 
 At a more fundamental level, there is the question concerning the responsiveness of 
Chinese enterprises, SOEs in particular, to the imperative of late development. Put in another 
way, without sufficient entrepreneurial initiatives and capabilities in the corporate sector, the 
reciprocity relationship might simply break down and the hope-for developmental objectives 
could not be achieved. To address this question, it is necessary to turn to the analysis of the 
past achievements of and future prospects for China’s enterprise reform. 
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 4. Enterprise Reform and Development: A Re-interpretation 
 
Any appraisal of China’s enterprise reform over the past two decades must begin with looking 
at the actual experience, rather than with notional ‘first principles’ of economic theory. For, 
the experience has been known to many observers as a paradox for standard economic theory. 
Three quick indications below suffice to demonstrate this point (for an elaborated account of 
China’s enterprise reform and development along this line, see Lo [1999b]). 
 The first point that comes out is a trend in Chinese enterprise development that is in 
sharp contrast to widely-held perceptions. Between 1978 and 2002, the value-added share of 
large-scale enterprises in Chinese industry not only was held stable but rather increased, from 
31% to 36%. And the vast majority, still around 75-80% by the turn of the century, of these 
enterprises are in fact SOEs. Thus, there is a paradox needing explanation: given that large-
scale enterprises are after all the core of China’s state economic sector, what has accounted 
for their expanding output share in the reform era? 
 Figure 3 presents yet another paradox. The pre-tax profit rate (i.e., profit-to-capital 
ratio) of SOEs has been very close to Chinese industry as a whole throughout the reform era – 
slightly higher in the 1980s, slightly lower in the 1990s. And large-scale enterprises have 
persistently outperformed other enterprise sectors, both SOEs and non-SOEs, in this regard. 
Again, how did all these come about? 
[Figure 3] 
 The above two pieces of evidence stand in contrast to the widely-held perception, or 
allegation, that China’s industrial SOEs have done poorly both financially and in terms of 
productive efficiency. Moreover, recall the discussion in the previous section on the 
‘fundamental contradiction’ in the Chinese economy, which implies that the main cause of the 
financial difficulty of the state sector lies in the state itself, rather than the under-performance 
of SOEs. In contrast to the allegation that SOEs have been a drag on the economy in the form 
of taking up state subsidies and generating bad loans for state banks, the distributive 
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relationship between the state and SOEs has been characterized by surplus transfer from the 
latter to the former. Thus, the respectable performance of SOEs as indicated above has in fact 
been achieved despite the state policies of extraction and under-capitalization (Lo [1999b] 
provides a detailed analysis of these issues). 
 The data in Table 2 indicate that, throughout the reform era, the state policy of under-
capitalizing SOEs has been in effect. Compared with other ownership sectors, SOEs has been 
facing an especially heavy burden of taxation. At its extreme, the ratio of after-tax to pre-tax 
profit for SOEs was a mere 0.15 in 1997, which was less than a half of that of collectively-
owned enterprises, and less than a third of that of private firms, share-holding enterprises and 
foreign capital-funded enterprises. And this policy has been implemented despite the secular 
decline in enterprise profitability, reflected in Figure 3, as well as the fiscal system reform 
after 1994 that was purportedly aimed at providing a level playing field for enterprises of all 
ownership sectors (Cheng and Lo [2002] argue that the secular decline in industrial profit 
rates has been caused mainly by the worsening demand-side, macroeconomic conditions, 
rather than by worsening efficiency on the part of SOEs and other enterprises). This piece of 
evidence, again, runs counter to the widely-held perception that SOEs have been especially 
favoured by the state. 
[Table 2] 
Thus, the nature of China’s enterprise reform, of SOEs in particular, needs rethinking. 
At one level, the reform could be characterized as a process of the state hiring and motivating 
managerial services in the corporate sector. At another level, however, this process has 
evolved within a context of the broader reform which involved main stake-holders both inside 
and outside the enterprise – local authorities, workers, local communities, banks and related 
business entities – to form a system of check and balance in enterprise development. The 
evolution of the reform from the profit-retention system to the tax-for-profit reform (ligaishui, 
where income tax replaced profit delivery as the main form of state extraction), the contract 
management system and finally to the corporatization drive aimed at establishing the modern 
corporate system, clearly reflects this character. Thus, China’s reformed enterprise system has 
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become similar in nature to the canonical East Asian system that is infused with institutional 
rigidities and long-term orientations. From the discussion in Section 2, there are established 
economic theories to explain the competitive advantage (and disadvantage) of enterprise 
systems of this kind. Succinctly, in the context of steadily expanding market demand, 
institutions that are infused with rigidities and long-term orientations have the advantage of 
promoting productivity growth through dynamic increasing returns, particularly collective 
learning effects. The down-side of such institutions, though, is their inflexibility in adjusting 
to cope with demand contraction. The fact indicated above that China’s SOEs basically 
outperformed non-SOEs in the boom years of the 1980s but were outperformed in the 
demand-deficient years of the 1990s could be seen in this light. 
 To the extent that the depicted performance is indeed related to these institutional 
arrangements, two analytical questions can then be asked: first, how is the reformed Chinese 
enterprise system distinguished from the traditional Soviet-type system, and, second, what 
positive effect on enterprise competitiveness might be generated by this system, amid the loss 
of allocative efficiency that is (theoretically) likely to be caused by otherwise sub-optimal 
arrangements? Bearing in mind the advantage and limitation of formal statements, these 
questions are answered by means of the four propositions detailed below. 
Proposition 1: Soft budget constraints as a necessary condition for corporate 
entrepreneurship. 
 It has long been held that soft budget constraints are a fatal weakness of the 
traditional Soviet-type system. But what precisely is a soft budget constraint? Kornai (1980) 
uses the term to summaries a set of behavioural phenomena – notably that the survival of the 
enterprise is guaranteed by the state, and that its expansion involves an asymmetry between 
reward and punishment – and posits that these are endemic to public ownership in a structural 
sense. But, in the literature on China’s reform experience, Hua et al. (1986) argue that the 
structural condition for constraining soft-budgeted behaviour is less generic: what is needed is 
the clarification of the boundary of interests of enterprises. Zhang (1987) further makes the 
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point that so long as the soft external financing does not blur the cost-revenue structure of the 
firm, it would not leave much room for soft-budgeted behaviour. 
 In practice, the hardening of China’s enterprise budget constraints is achieved mainly 
through increased product market competition. This, coupled with enhanced autonomy and 
incentives, institutionalizes the interests of enterprises. In respect of external financing, the 
afore-mentioned lending-for-appropriation financial reform also appears to have brought 
about the effect of hardening budget constraints. By replacing bank lending for state 
allocation, it reduces the shortcomings of the previous system which blurred the cost-revenue 
structure of enterprises. By requiring payment for the cost of external financing, the reform 
also forces enterprises to economize on its uses (Wang and Li 1991). 
 Not only has the reformed enterprise system curtailed the previous shortcomings, but 
it has also promoted entrepreneurship. Conceptually, a hard budget constraint can be achieved 
only when the firm is strictly under the discipline of the market, particularly the market for 
corporate control and the managerial market – the ideal state of property rights theory 
(Demsetz 1983; Kornai 1990). However, in the theoretical literature, there are well-developed 
arguments that strict market regulation tends to produce short-termism and volatility. The 
planning horizon of external financing entities (which must be utility-maximizing, natural-
personal individuals if hard budget constraints are to be achieved) can be much shorter than 
what is required for productive/entrepreneurial activities. A certain degree of soft budget 
constraints is thus necessary for the long-term pursuits of firms. In a similar vein, compared 
with the managerial market, an internal promotion ladder that extends to the top management 
is more capable of enhancing the long-term commitment of inside members of the firm and 
hence their pursuit of long-term, entrepreneurial endeavours (Lazonick 1991; Teece 1993). 
 In the context of China, an economy under systemic reform and structural change, it 
is conceivable that the development of entrepreneurship takes time and that this development 
can be interrupted by fluctuations in the institutional and developmental environment. Hence, 
a soft budget constraint is instrumental in protecting potentially efficient firms from being 
wiped out by the fluctuations (though it also protects inefficient firms at the same time). It 
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should be noted that virtually none of the Chinese enterprises that compete successfully in the 
world market today could be regarded as efficient ten years ago. 
The rationalization drive in Chinese industry in the 1990s is especially illustrative of 
soft budget constraints as a necessary condition for corporate entrepreneurship. This drive, 
which took the form of mergers and take-overs on a massive scale, has greatly improved the 
structures (and international competitiveness) of a wide range of dynamic industries. These 
rationalization activities are clearly entrepreneurial, and have been largely initiated by the 
enterprises themselves (Jiang et al. [1993]; Lo and Chan [1998]; SCESR [1992]). As even 
these entrepreneurial firms (mostly qiye jituan or industrial groups) were small in scale 
relative to the rationalization activities and had faced severe financial constraints, it is certain 
that the activities could not have taken place without the scope allowed by soft budget 
constraints. 
Proposition 2: Government intervention as a surrogate for (underdeveloped) 
corporate entrepreneurship. 
The issue of government intervention can be viewed in the same way. It is not the 
place here to summarize the theoretical arguments for and against government intervention in 
the vast development literature, but suffice it to say that the same arguments concerning soft 
budget constraints – i.e., protecting efficient firms against fluctuations and facilitating their 
long-term endeavours – can apply. Moreover, in the context where corporate entrepreneurship 
is underdeveloped, the government can act as a surrogate (though of course it can also make 
mistakes). This is indeed a general thesis developed by writers like Amsden (1989) and Wade 
(1990) who, among others, argue that an essential feature of East Asian industrialization is the 
entrepreneurial role played by the government. 
 The rationalization drive in Chinese industry in the 1990s is again illuminating in this 
regard. Especially in the initial phase, the mergers and take-overs took place mainly among 
enterprises of the same regions. This indicates the crucial role played by local authorities. In 
the meantime, there are other activities initiated by local authorities which have proved to be 
important in improving the efficiency and international competitiveness of Chinese industry – 
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the promotion of joint R&D activities for indigenizing imported technology being a case in 
point. These again can be regarded as entrepreneurial. 
 As for curtailing the negative effects of government intervention, the specific form of 
reform has proved crucial. The contract management system implies the institutionalization of 
a bargaining regime, where local authorities are involved in enterprise decision-making, while 
abandoning the pursuit of an arm’s-length state-enterprise relationship that is supposedly 
required by the principles of the market. But, there is an important difference between the 
new bargaining regime and that under the Soviet-type system: the bargaining now centres 
around financial performance, instead of inputs allocation and outputs delivery which are 
characteristic of central planning. This curtails the room for soft-budgeted behaviour on the 
part of enterprises. It also implies that government intervention becomes more formal, or less 
ad hoc, because it is largely carried out via the unified contract-issuing committees instead of 
the industrial bureaux and other offices that are not well co-ordinated. 
 The formation of industrial concerns since the late 1980s has also proved capable of 
restructuring the state-enterprise relationship in a way that reduces crucial deficiencies in 
government intervention. This is related to its dealing with the immobility of productive 
assets across localities or ministerial affiliations. Especially in fast growing industries, there 
are cases whereby nationwide industrial concerns take over the control of enterprises from the 
concerned local authorities. The latter thus become shareholders, and their intervention in 
enterprise operations becomes less ad hoc than previously. 
 Proposition 3: The employment relationship as idiosyncratic exchange. 
It is well-known that China’s employment system has been characterized by both low 
labour mobility and rigid wage adjustment. It is also well-known that the reform has fallen far 
short of official targets. At least until the 1995-97 enterprise downsizing drive, measures like 
dismissal and widening wage differentials have rarely been practised, whereas workers 
through a collective bargaining regime can have considerable influence over the distribution 
of enterprise surplus. All these are problematic from a standard neoclassical, or neo-liberal, 
point of view. 
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 Nevertheless, in the theoretical literature, there are alternative theories arguing that a 
rigid employment relationship does have merit. The idea of idiosyncratic exchange raised by 
Williamson et al. (1975) is representative of these theories. Essentially, it says that some 
degree of rigidity in the employment relationship can help to establish the loyalty of workers, 
and thus can be more conducive – than the standard emphasis on strictly linking short-term, 
individualistic performance with reward – to the performance of firms. This rests on the 
premise that there are significant gains from firm-specific, or idiosyncratic, knowledge 
acquired by incumbent workers. In the context of late industrialization, this theory has been 
pushed further to incorporate two more points: first, that learning is a collective activity and, 
second, that the learning effect is actively generated by workers and is thus not marketable. 
Hence, from the standpoint of promoting the productive efficiency of the firm, co-operation is 
required not only between the two sides of the employment relationship but also among major 
participants of the production system as a whole (Best 1990). 
 In China, the contribution of the rigid employment system is particularly evident in 
the application of a range of operational practices such as the Japanese-style just-in-time 
(kanban) system, quality circles, workers’ suggestions for operational improvement, etc. The 
significance of these practices is that, just like the Japanese case, they are essential to the 
flexibility of enterprises in responding to fluctuations in market demand. However, and again 
just like the Japanese case, flexibility-based practices – which by lifting buffer stocks implies 
rigorous demand for on-site quality control and problem-solving – cannot be successfully 
instituted without the active participation of the workers. The rigid employment relationship, 
which fosters the long-term commitment of workers, is thus crucial in this regard. 
 Finally, regarding the curtailment of the negative effects of the rigid employment 
system, positive achievements have also arisen out of China’s specific reform measures. One 
major measure is ‘unemployment inside the enterprise’, which is analogous to lay-offs in 
capitalist countries but with the unemployment insurance coming from the firm rather than 
from the state. Except in 1995-97 when outright firing was a widespread practice amid the 
state-encouraged drive of downsizing, this measure has promoted competition among workers 
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for formal jobs, with those outcompeted becoming ‘unemployed’ but continuing to stay in the 
enterprise. These workers only receive a basic wage, rather than wage plus bonus, and have to 
face the embarrassing status of working at informal jobs (Liu 1993). Thus, by strengthening 
the link between reward and performance, the reform has helped to enhance work incentives. 
The strengthening of the link between the income of the inside members as a group and that 
of the enterprise under broader reforms has also helped to bring about peer group pressure on 
individual workers for good performance. 
 Proposition 4: The competitiveness of the firm depends on the match between the 
organizational form and the growth pattern. 
 The discussion above thus clarifies the general thesis that the substitution between 
market and (non-market) institutional regulation implies a trade-off between allocative and 
productive efficiency, and that the seemingly sub-optimal arrangements of China’s reformed 
enterprise system can be viewed in this light. But the question remains unanswered as to what 
is the link between the enterprise performance and the characterized institutions. Precisely 
because the sub-optimal arrangements can have both favourable and detrimental effects on 
enterprise efficiency, it is necessary to investigate under what circumstances the outcome of 
the reformed enterprise system, on balance, will be positive. 
 Aoki’s (1990, p.9) view, as indicated in section 2, provides some insight: ‘(in the 
situation) where external environments are continually changing but not too drastically, the J-
mode is superior. In this case, the information value created by learning and horizontal 
coordination at the operational level may more than compensate for the loss of efficiency due 
to the sacrifice of operational specialization.’ The net outcome thus depends on the pattern of 
economic growth. This view is in line with the discussion on techno-economic paradigm that 
is now the focus of various strands of economics: neo-Schumpeterian theory of innovation, 
flexible specialization, structuralist economics, the French regulation school, etc. 
 A common theme of these strands concerns the connection between the nature of 
technical change and the demand conditions, the latter being in turn regulated by social 
relations. An appropriate match between the two sides (e.g., mass production and mass 
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consumption) can greatly promote productivity growth, whereas a mismatch can cause crisis. 
But late developing countries are prone to have mismatch because of their position as 
technology followers, and of possible consumption demonstration effects from developed 
countries (for a survey of the theoretical literature, see Lo [1995]). At the micro-level, firms 
in late developing countries face continually shifting demands towards new products, which 
implies good rewards for early entrants. Hence, successful adoption and improvement upon 
imported technology can be crucial for competitiveness. This is even more so if the 
environment is coupled with rapidly expanding demand, which promotes productivity growth 
through (dynamic) economies of scale. 
In this regard, there is ample evidence suggesting that China’s pattern of economic 
growth over the reform era has been basically of this kind. Specifically, the crucial role of 
technology imports and changing market demand is associated with the explosive expansion 
of the ‘new (consumer durables) industries’, the impact of which has been felt by the entire 
Chinese population. These industries are in general characterized by high income elasticity of 
demand and rapid technical change. As a consequence, the capabilities of collective learning 
of SOEs, underpinned by their relatively more rigid institutional arrangements, are likely to 
have been an important source of their competitiveness (Lo [1999b] presents evidence on this 
from a range of descriptive and regression analyses). 
 The discussion finally leads to a coherent explanation of the features of China’s 
enterprise performance depicted in the beginning of the section. The crux is that rigidity (or 
flexibility) has both its merits and defects with respect to enterprise performance, and the 
outcome on balance depends on the wider context of the pattern of economic growth. As 
indicated above, in the boom period of the 1980s, SOEs outperformed non-SOEs in financial 
terms. In the demand-deficient period of the 1990s, however, SOEs were outperformed. At 
the extreme, during the recession years of 1989-91, whilst as many as one-third of collective 
township and village enterprises stopped operations or went bankrupt, the same phenomenon 
was rare for SOEs. The dismal financial performance of SOEs in the major part of the 1990s 
thus can be attributed to two main reasons. First, without the exit option, SOEs have had to 
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keep on running even in times of recession and weak market demand. Second, because of the 
rigidity of wage adjustment, the unit cost of production has tended to go up amid contraction 
of the production scale. 
On the whole, China’s experience of enterprise development appears to confirm the 
thesis that rigid institutional arrangements of the kinds depicted above are bad for enterprises 
in responding to severe market fluctuations, but are good for improving productivity in the 
context of steadily expanding demand. The comparison of financial performance between 
SOEs and non-SOEs can be explained in this way. The fact that small-scale SOEs have been 
persistently outperformed by both large scale SOEs and non-SOEs suggests that, in their case, 
the gain from rigidity is not sufficient to compensate for the loss from lacking flexibility. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Viewing China’s reform experience in the light of the East Asian development experience, 
and of late development in general, gives rise to significant implications. From the analysis in 
the preceding sections, it can be posited that a central characteristic of China’s market-
oriented economic system reform is the gradual shift of the orientation of the state from 
socialist commitments to developmental concerns. The massive shrinkage of the output share 
of SOEs in Chinese industry is a clear indication of the decline in socialist commitments. The 
retention of a sizeable and expanding sector of large-scale enterprises under state control, 
however, indicates that the state has not re-oriented itself to embrace the orthodox free market 
model. It rather indicates a primarily developmental concern: the state is to retain control over 
the commanding heights of the economy and thereby to direct the overall development, amid 
the general direction of mercerization. This is largely in the spirit of the East Asian model of 
late development. 
 And there are well-developed theoretical arguments in support of the model in 
achieving development. In particular, it could be argued that the sources of entrepreneurship, 
which is the central element of development, could be multiple. Entrepreneurship could be a 
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collective activity as well as an individualistic one, with their relative advantages depending 
on their appropriate match or otherwise with the macro and developmental conditions. 
Notions such as the ‘entrepreneurial firm’ and the ‘developmental state’, which flow out from 
the literature on East Asian experience, are thus of relevance. 
In this connection, however, the widespread over-capacity in Chinese industry since 
the mid-1990s and, more generally, the phenomenon of deflation are clearly antithetical to the 
feasibility of adopting the East Asian model in China. The short-term cause of the phenomena 
is discernibly the 1995-97 drive of enterprise downsizing enforced by the state, i.e., its policy 
of ‘grabbing the big and letting-go the small’ (zhuada fangxiao). By design or by default, the 
policy was seized upon by local authorities of various levels to sell off SOEs and lay off 
workers. The possibility of facilitating enterprises to grow out of over-sizing, in contrast, was 
scarcely considered. Meanwhile, it is also discernible that the phenomena of over-capacity 
and deflation can be to a significant extent attributed to a long-term trend in income 
distribution: the deteriorating position of the bottom layer of the society, both urban and rural, 
which however tends to have a higher marginal propensity to consume. Overall, therefore, the 
transformation of China’s economic system in the direction of the free market model appears 
to be incompatible with the pursuit of the East Asian model. Whether or not this is the case, 
by undermining egalitarian income distribution and the arrangements for collective learning, 
the transformation clearly leaves little scope for the pursuit of socialism. 
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Figure 1. SOEs’ Shares of Output, Employment and Capital in Industry, 1978-2002 
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Sources: China Statistical Yearbook and China Industrial Economics Statistical Yearbook, various 
issues. 
Notes: V = value-added at current prices, L = labour employment, K = net value of fixed assets. 
Figures are shares of SOEs from 1978 to 1995 and of SOEs plus state-controlled shareholding 
enterprises from 1996 in Chinese industry as a whole. 
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Figure 2. Shares of Deposits with Financial Institutions, 1983-2002 
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Sources: China Statistical Yearbook and Almanac of China's Finance and Banking, various issues. 
Notes: A = state; B = enterprises; C = households. Data for 1993 and before are of state banks, while 
those for 1994 and after are of all financial institutions. 
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 Figure 3. Pre-tax Profit Rates of Industrial Enterprises, 1978-2002 
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Sources: China Statistical Yearbook and China Industrial Economics Statistical Yearbook, various 
issues. 
Notes: Pre-tax profit rate = (total taxes + total profits) / (working capital + net value of fixed assets). 
A = all enterprises, B = SOEs, C = large-scale enterprises. 
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Table 1. Uses of Credit Funds of Financial Institutions, 1996 and 2000 
  Uses of funds total
(100 m yuan)
Of which: loans
(100 m yuan)
1996 All financial institutions 76971 61153
 State banks 63247 47435
 Share of state banks 82% 78%
  
2000 All financial institutions 135484 99371
 State banks 110129 76394
 Share of state banks 81% 77%
Sources Almanac of China's Finance and Banking 2001, pp.374-375. 
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 Table 2. Pre-tax vs. After-tax Profit Rates of Enterprise Sectors, 1986-2002 
  Total Of total: Of total:
  SOEs COEs OOEs LEs
1986 (a) pre-tax 20.43% 20.65% 19.36% 23.29% 22.25%
 (b) after-tax 10.77% 10.62% 11.15% 14.87% 11.26%
 (b)/(a) 0.53 0.51 0.58 0.64 0.51
    
1991 (a) pre-tax 11.88% 11.81% 11.89% 12.85% 13.72%
 (b) after-tax 3.42% 2.86% 4.49% 7.44% 3.71%
 (b)/(a) 0.29 0.24 0.38 0.58 0.27
    
1997 (a) pre-tax 6.92% 6.27% 8.27% 7.39% 8.51%
 (b) after-tax 2.05% 0.92% 3.19% 3.67% 2.91%
 (b)/(a) 0.30 0.15 0.39 0.50 0.34
    
2002 (a) pre-tax 10.00% 9.14% 12.22% 11.14% 10.53%
 (b) after-tax 4.81% 3.64% 6.68% 6.56% 5.00%
 (b)/(a) 0.48 0.40 0.55 0.59 0.48
Sources China Statistical Yearbook and China Industrial Economics Statistical Yearbook, various 
issues. 
Notes SOEs = state-owned enterprises; COEs = collectively-owned enterprises; OOEs = other 
ownership-type enterprises, including share-holding enterprises, private enterprises, 
individually-owned enterprises and foreign capital-funded enterprises. LEs = large-scale 
enterprises. 
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